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Interpretation of Article V of the New 
York Convention in the Eleventh Circuit: 
Industrial Risk Insurers 
JUAN C. GARCIA & IVAN BRACHO GONZALEZ* 
The widespread use and growing preference for interna-
tional arbitration over cross-border litigation is primarily 
due to the existence of a clear and straightforward regime 
for the enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards. 
Even though this was not always the case, through the ap-
pearance of the New York Convention and the United Na-
tions Commission on International Trade Law 
(“UNCITRAL”) Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration, the treatment and acceptance of international 
arbitration in different legal regimes has undergone a har-
monization process which has served to develop consistency. 
That harmonization process, however, has not been comple-
ted. Several jurisdictions, even within their own borders, ap-
ply and interpret the New York Convention differently. One 
example of those jurisdictions is the United States, where fe-
deralism allows that federal law be applied in a non-consis-
tent manner by different federal circuit courts of appeals. In 
particular, this Article analyzes the persistent notion deve-
loped by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit, which has held and confirmed that the grounds for 
annulment of a foreign arbitral award—or awards with a fo-
reign component—are those listed in the New York 
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Convention and not those contemplated by federal law. The 
case, Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshütte 
GmbH, represents a divorce from longstanding precedent 
from other circuit courts of appeals, which have correctly 
and repeatedly held that the grounds for refusing enforce-
ment of an award found in the New York Convention cannot 
be considered as grounds for annulment. 
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW ON THE ENFORCEMENT 
AND ANNULMENT OF ARBITRAL AWARDS ...........................1081 
II. ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRAL AWARDS UNDER THE NEW 
YORK CONVENTION .............................................................1086 
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Law is a species of order, and hence good law nec-
essarily implies good order.1 
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW ON THE ENFORCEMENT AND 
ANNULMENT OF ARBITRAL AWARDS 
As international arbitration experienced exponential growth in 
the early twentieth century, the enforcement of international arbitral 
 
 1 THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 174 (J.E.C. Weldon trans., MacMillan and 
Co. 1901). 
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awards depended almost entirely on comity.2 Under one view of  this 
regime, known as “Comity of Nations,” the enforcement of foreign 
legislative, executive, or judicial acts, including arbitral awards, was 
left to the discretion of the courts of the nation where enforcement 
was sought.3 According to this theory, courts enforced foreign judg-
ments and awards as a courtesy to foreign states.4 This enforcement 
regime did not serve arbitration well.5 Without an international 
framework establishing a unified procedure for the enforcement of 
arbitral awards, parties had no certainty whether awards would be 
enforced and the parties allowed to collect the judgment.6 Without 
such certainty, parties would be reluctant to resolve their disputes 
through arbitration.7 
During the 1920s, two seminal treaties, the Geneva Protocol on 
Arbitration Clauses of 1923 and the Geneva Convention on the Ex-
ecution of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927 (collectively, the “Ge-
neva Conventions”) were enacted to facilitate enforcement of both 
arbitration clauses and arbitral awards, with the goal of making in-
ternational arbitration a viable and effective dispute resolution 
method.8 The Geneva Conventions established a regime under 
which parties from different jurisdictions could enforce arbitration 
clauses and awards in virtually any jurisdiction.9 
The procedural framework established by the Geneva Conven-
tions, however, soon became burdensome and complex. Parties 
seeking enforcement of arbitral awards were required to seek con-
firmation of the award in the jurisdiction where, or under the laws 
of which, the award was issued before being able to seek enforce-
ment abroad.10 This “double exequatur” regime was cumbersome 
 
 2 JACOB VAN DE VALDEN, FINALITY IN LITIGATION: THE LAW AND PRACTICE 
OF PRECLUSION – RES JUDICATA (MERGER AND ESTOPPEL), ABUSE OF PROCESS 
AND RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 238–42 (2017). 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 W. Laurence Craig, Some Trends and Developments in the Laws and Prac-
tice of International Commercial Arbitration, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 8–9 (1995). 
 6 Id. at 8. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. at 9. 
 9 Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Sept. 26, 1967, 
92 L.N.T.S. 302, 305–06 [hereinafter Geneva Convention]. 
 10 Id. 
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and caused delay because the party seeking enforcement would first 
need to initiate an action to confirm the award where it was issued, 
known as the seat of the arbitration, and then bring a second action 
in the foreign jurisdiction in which enforcement was sought.11 
In order to eliminate the need to confirm the award in two juris-
dictions, the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 (“New York Convention” 
or “Convention”) created a simplified regime allowing the enforce-
ment of both arbitration agreements and arbitration awards.12 With 
respect to the enforcement of awards, the New York Convention’s 
framework allows a successful party in an international arbitration 
to enforce the award in any jurisdiction where the losing party has 
assets, provided that such jurisdiction is a contracting state to the 
Convention, without first confirming the award at the arbitral seat.13 
The Convention also sets forth the grounds that may be invoked 
by a party opposing enforcement of the award and the grounds that 
can be raised ex officio by the court in which enforcement is sought 
to deny the enforcement of an award.14 The Convention, therefore, 
governs both enforcement and denial of enforcement of an arbitral 
award.15 The Convention, however, does not establish grounds for 
the annulment or vacatur of arbitral awards and does not apply to 
annulment proceedings.16 
Denying enforcement of an arbitral award is very different from 
annulling or vacating an award, and the two concepts are not inter-
changeable.17 Each concept grants the parties distinct legal rights 
 
 11 Id. 
 12 May Lu, The New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards: Analysis of the Seven Defenses to Oppose Enforce-
ment in the United States and England, 23 ARIZ. J. OF INT’L AND COMP. LAW 747, 
749 (2006). 
 13 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, arts. III–IV, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Con-
vention]. 
 14 Id. art. V(2). 
 15 See id. 
 16 ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1958: AN 
OVERVIEW 4 (last visited April 22, 2020) https://www.arbitration-icca.org/me-
dia/0/12125884227980/new_york_convention_of_1958_ 
overview.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2020). 
 17 Id. 
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and is subject to different legal and procedural requirements.18 The 
difference between the two concepts is best understood by analyzing 
the actions parties may take after an arbitral tribunal issues its 
award.19 
If the losing party does not voluntarily comply with the terms of 
the award, the winning party may seek to enforce the award either 
in the jurisdiction where the award was issued (the arbitral seat) or 
in any other jurisdiction where the losing party has assets.20 Con-
versely, the losing party may oppose enforcement of the award in 
any of the jurisdictions where the winning party seeks to enforce, 
based on the grounds established in the New York Convention.21 
The losing party may also seek to vacate or annul the award at the 
seat of the arbitration.22 The procedure and grounds for annulling 
the award are established by the lex arbitri, or the law of the seat of 
the arbitration, rather than by the New York Convention.23 
Each mechanism also has a different legal effect on the arbitral 
award.24 Annulment or vacatur of an award, according to the general 
rule adopted by most courts throughout the world, annuls the award 
and precludes it from having any legal effect whatsoever.25 This ap-
proach, known as Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit, stands for the proposition that, 
once the award is annulled by a court of the seat of the arbitration—
or primary jurisdiction—it cannot produce any legal effects because 
“nothing comes from nothing.”26 As such, an award that has been 
annulled at the seat cannot then be enforced in another jurisdiction. 
 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. at 4, 13–14. 
 20 Lu, supra note 12, at 748. 
 21 Id. at 748, 755. 
 22 VAN DEN BERG, supra note 16, at 4. 
 23 Claudia Salomon & Irina Sivachenko, Choosing an Arbitral Seat in the 
United States (last visited Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.lw.com/ 
thoughtLeadership/choosing-an-arbitral-seat-in-the-us (explaining that the “Lex 
Arbitri” or “Lex Loci Arbitri” refers to the law of the seat or the place of arbitra-
tion); see New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V(1)(e) (stating that the seat 
can be defined as the country “in which, or under the law of which, [the] award 
was made”). 
 24 William W. Park, The Arbitrator’s Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction, 
V. Items for Further Consideration, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2006: BACK 
TO BASICS? 112, 127 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2007). 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
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To the contrary, when a court in an enforcing jurisdiction refuses 
or denies the enforcement of an award, such denial does not alter the 
legal status of the award.27 In other words, a denial of enforcement 
does not annul the award nor preclude its subsequent enforcement 
in another jurisdiction.28 
Consequently, courts at the seat of arbitration play an important 
role in the annulment process as they are the “competent authority,” 
as envisaged by the Convention, tasked with deciding annulment 
petitions.29 Accordingly, courts deciding annulment or enforcement 
petitions must have a clear understanding of the relevant framework 
applicable to these proceedings, because as described above, each 
cause of action is different and will have a different effect upon the 
award, and the parties’ rights. 
Given the crucial role played by courts at the seat, this chapter 
will address an exceptional instance in which a federal appellate 
court in the United States “conflated” the grounds for denying en-
forcement and vacating arbitral awards.30 More specifically, it will 
analyze a unique case from the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit (“Eleventh Circuit”) where the court ignored 
the distinction between the denial of enforcement and annulment of 
arbitral awards previously established by other circuit courts in the 
 
 27 Susan Choi, Judicial Enforcement of Arbitration Awards Under the ICSID 
and New York Conventions, 28 N.Y.U. INT’L L. & POL. 175, 196 (1995). 
 28 It must be noted that the general rule on enforcement of awards is that once 
an award has been annulled at the legal seat of the arbitration, it cannot be en-
forced in any other jurisdiction. However, there have been some instances in 
which courts of secondary jurisdiction have allowed enforcement of awards that 
were previously annulled. Yet, the issue of enforcement of awards notwithstand-
ing their annulment has generated a hotly debate among scholars and courts, and 
consensus on the matter has not been reached. 
 29 See New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V(1) (stating that “[r]ecog-
nition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party 
against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority 
where the recognition and enforcement is sought.”) (emphasis added). However, 
that is not to say that courts at the seat will not decide motions from parties resist-
ing enforcement, as that could be the case. 
 30 Juan C. Garcia, Juliana de Valdenebro & Daniela Tagtachian, A Legal 
Framework Is Only as Good as Its Implementation: The Conflation of Grounds 
for Denying Enforcement and Vacating Arbitral Awards in Industrial Risk, 
XXXIII(3) INT’L L.Q. 22, 23 (2017). 
1086 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:1080 
 
United States, and thus failed to properly identify the grounds for 
vacatur. 
It must be noted at the outset that the grounds for annulment or 
vacatur in most jurisdictions mirror the grounds for refusing en-
forcement under the New York Convention, and as such it may ap-
pear as the distinction is one of no consequence. That is not the case, 
however, in the United States, and therefore ignoring the distinction 
between vacatur and denial of enforcement can have significant con-
sequences.31 
II. ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRAL AWARDS UNDER THE NEW 
YORK CONVENTION 
As mentioned in Part I, the New York Convention was intended 
to simplify the burdensome and lengthy process of enforcement of 
international arbitral awards under the Geneva Conventions. In or-
der to promote efficiency, the Convention sets forth an exclusive list 
of grounds upon which a court may deny enforcement of an award.32 
Article V(1) of the Convention establishes that “[r]ecognition 
and enforcement of the award may be refused . . . only if that party 
[opposing enforcement] furnishes to the competent authority where 
the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof” that one of the 
grounds listed therein is present. 33 In other words, a court must en-
force an international arbitral award unless the party resisting en-
forcement successfully proves that one of the grounds for refusing 
enforcement. 
The exclusive grounds for denying enforcement of an award un-
der Article V(1) of the Convention include the following: 
1. Recognition and Enforcement of the award may be 
refused, at the request of the party against whom it is 
invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent 
authority where the recognition and enforcement is 
sought, proof that: 
 
 31 Id. at 22–23. 
 32 Craig, supra note 5, at 10. 
 33 New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V(1). 
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(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article 
II were, under the law applicable to them, under 
some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid 
under law to which the parties have subjected it or, 
failing any indication thereon, under the law of the 
country where the award was made; or 
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was 
not given proper notice of the appointment of the ar-
bitration or of the arbitration proceedings or was oth-
erwise unable to present his case; or 
(c) The award deals with a difference not contem-
plated by or not falling within the terms of the sub-
mission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on 
matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbi-
tration, provided that, if the decision on matters sub-
mitted to arbitration can be separated from those not 
submitted, that part of the award which contains de-
cisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be 
recognized and enforced; or 
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the 
arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the 
agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, 
was not in accordance with the law of the country 
where the arbitration took place; or 
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the par-
ties, or has been set aside or suspended by a compe-
tent authority of the country in which, or under the 
law which, that award was made.34 
Additionally, Article V(2) lists the grounds upon which courts 
of the enforcing jurisdiction can rely ex officio to deny enforcement. 
Article V(2) provides the following: 
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award 
may also be refused if the competent authority in the 
 
 34 Id. (emphasis added). 
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country where recognition and enforcement is sought 
finds that: 
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable 
of settlement by arbitration under the law of that 
country; or 
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award 
would be contrary to the public policy of that coun-
try.35  
As noted above, the grounds included in the Convention are only 
available to parties opposing enforcement of an arbitral award. The 
Convention does not establish grounds for the annulment of arbitral 
awards.36 Although the Convention does not explicitly distinguish 
between denial of enforcement and annulment of an award, Article 
V(1)(e) implicitly recognizes this distinction, providing that a party 
may oppose enforcement of an award when  
“[t]he award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been 
set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in 
which, or under the law of which, that award was made.”37 Article 
V(1)(e) presupposes the existence of a different procedure for an-
nulment by the courts of the seat of the arbitration in accordance 
with the laws of the seat. 
This distinction is consistent with the contracting parties’ con-
cern that including grounds for annulment in the Convention could 
impact their sovereignty and ability to regulate their internal mat-
ters.38 As recognized by Leonard V. Quigley, a member of the Coun-
cil on Foreign Relations, in an article published merely three years 
after the creation of the Convention: 
Significantly, [Article V(1)(e) of the New York Con-
vention] fails to specify the grounds upon which the 
rendering State may set aside or suspend the award. 
While it would have provided greater reliability to 
 
 35 Id. art. V(2). 
 36 VAN DEN BERG, supra note 16, at 4. 
 37 See New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V(1)(e) (emphasis added). 
 38 Leonard V. Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 
YALE L.J. 1049, 1069–70 (1961). 
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the enforcement of awards under the Convention had 
the available grounds been defined in some way, 
such action would have constituted meddling with 
national procedure for handling domestic awards, a 
subject beyond the competence of the Conference.39 
In short, including grounds for annulment in the Convention 
would have imposed upon the Convention an “authority and scope 
which the document’s framers and signatory states not only did not 
intend, but likely did not foresee.”40 
III. VACATUR OR ANNULMENT OF ARBITRAL AWARDS 
In a typical international arbitration, the parties specify the ju-
ridical seat of the arbitration in the arbitration agreement.41 The seat 
of arbitration, in turn, determines the procedural law for the conduct 
of the arbitration, also known as the lex arbitri.42 In other words, 
“the local courts of the seat of arbitration may, depending on the lo-
cal law, have the opportunity to intervene to designate the arbitral 
tribunal grant interim measures, or, rule on applications to set aside 
or vacate awards.”43 Therefore, the seat determines the law that will 
be applied to applications or motions to vacate or annul arbitral 
awards. 
A. Annulment framework in jurisdictions following the UNCITRAL 
Model Law 
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(“UNCITRAL”) adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration on June 21, 1985, for the purpose of 
“assist[ing] States in reforming and modernizing their laws on arbi-
tral procedure so as to take into account the particular features and 
 
 39 Id. at 1070. 
 40 Harout Jack Samra, Two to Tango: Domestic Grounds for Vacatur Under 
the New York Convention, 20(3) AM. REV. INT’L ARB., 367, 379 (2009). 
 41 Salomon & Sivachenko, supra note 23. 
 42 Id. 
 43 LUCY FERGUSON REED ET AL., GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 1, 14 
(2010). 
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needs of international commercial arbitration.”44 The Model Law, 
with its subsequent amendment of 2006, “reflects worldwide con-
sensus on key aspects of international arbitration practice having 
been accepted by States of all regions and the different legal or eco-
nomic systems of the world.”45 
Though not binding in nature, the Model Law proposes a text 
that states are free to adopt as their domestic arbitral law.46 Indeed, 
with limited modifications in some jurisdictions, the Model Law has 
been adopted by eighty nations.47 In jurisdictions in which it has 
been adopted in whole or in part, the Model Law constitutes the lex 
arbitri, which as stated above, sets forth the framework for annul-
ment or vacatur of arbitration awards. 
Regarding annulment, article 34 of the Model Law establishes 
“the application for setting aside as [the] exclusive recourse against 
[an] arbitral award,” and lists the grounds upon which courts at the 
seat of arbitration can rely on to annul or vacate an award.48 Notably, 
article 34 lists the exact same grounds for annulment that are found 
in article V of the New York Convention for denying enforcement 
of an award.49 
Given that the grounds for denying enforcement under the New 
York Convention are identical to the grounds for annulment under 
the Model Law, any distinction between the two mechanisms may 
seem meaningless. While this may be the case in jurisdictions where 
the Model Law has been adopted as lex arbitri without any modifi-
cations, ignoring the key distinctions between denying enforcement 
and annulment may have significant consequences in jurisdictions 
 
 44 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985) 
with Amendments as Adopted in 2006, UNITED NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L 
TRADE LAW, https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/modellaw/commercial 
_arbitration (last visited Apr. 22, 2020) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law 
Webpage]; see generally UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INT’L COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION (UNITED NATIONS 2006) [hereinafter UNCITRAL MODEL LAW]. 
 45 UNCITRAL Model Law Webpage, supra note 44. 
 46 See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 44. 
 47 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985) 
with Amendments as Adopted in 2006, UNITED NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L 
TRADE LAW, https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/modellaw/commercial 
_arbitration/status (last visited Apr. 22, 2020) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law 
Status]. 
 48 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 44, art. 34. 
 49 Compare id., with New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V. 
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in which the Model Law has not been adopted as the lex arbitri. In 
these jurisdictions, grounds for vacatur may very well differ from 
those established in the New York Convention regarding denial of 
enforcement.50 One notable jurisdiction that has not adopted the 
Model Law as its lex arbitri is the United States.51 
B. Annulment Framework in the United States 
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), codified in Title 9 of the 
United States Code, establishes the federal arbitral framework in the 
United States. The FAA consists of three chapters. The first chapter, 
9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (“Chapter One”), enacted in 1925 and codified in 
1947, covers domestic arbitrations and provides the grounds for an-
nulment of a domestic arbitral award.52 
The grounds to annul an arbitral award under Chapter One are 
listed in Section 10 and include the following: 
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, 
fraud, or undue means; 
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption 
in the arbitrators, or either of them; 
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct 
in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient 
cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence perti-
nent and material to the controversy; or of any other 
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have 
been prejudiced; or 
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so 
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and 
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was 
not made.53 
Unlike the Model Law, the grounds for annulling an award un-
der Chapter One of the FAA are different than those for denying 
 
 50 Garcia, de Valdenebro & Tagtachian, supra note 30, at 23. 
 51 Id.  
 52 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2018). 
 53 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2018). 
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enforcement under the New York Convention.54 Moreover, over 
time, courts have established non-statutory or implied grounds for 
annulling arbitral awards in addition to those set forth set forth in 
Chapter One of the FAA.55 These grounds, which include, among 
others, “manifest disregard of the law,” have been recognized and 
applied by some courts, but not accepted by others.56 
The second chapter of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–08 (“Chapter 
Two”), which was added in 1970, incorporates the New York Con-
vention and applies to all international, non-domestic, or foreign 
awards.57 Section 202 of Chapter Two provides that an award shall 
be deemed foreign or non-domestic if it has an international element 
(i.e., it “involves property located abroad, envisages performance or 
enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with one 
or more foreign states”), even if the award arises out of a relation-
ship between two United States citizens.58 Chapter Two includes the 
same grounds for denying the enforcement of an award listed in the 
New York Convention but, notably, does not include any grounds 
for the annulment of arbitral awards.59 
Congress also included in Chapter Two a special provision, 
§ 208, which provides guidance regarding how to resolve a conflict 
between chapters of the FAA.60 This provision, known as the “re-
sidual clause,” states that Chapter One may be used to fill in the gaps 
in Chapter Two, allowing the application of the former as long as it 
does not conflict with the latter.61 As explained below, the over-
whelming majority of United States courts have consistently held, 
relying on the residual clause, that the grounds for vacating an arbi-
tral award included in Chapter One for domestic arbitrations also 
 
 54 Compare id., with New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V. 
 55 Jonathan J. Tompkins, Manifest Disregard of the Law: The Continuing 
Evolution of an Historically Ambiguous Vacatur Standard, 12 DISP. RESOL. INT’L 
145, 147–49 (2018). 
 56 See generally id. (discussion on the “manifest disregard of the law” stand-
ard). 
 57 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–08. 
 58 Garcia, de Valdenebro & Tagtachian., supra note 30, at 23. 
 59 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–08. 
 60 9 U.S.C. § 208 (providing that “Chapter 1 applies to actions and proceed-
ings brought under this chapter to the extent that chapter is not in conflict with 
this chapter or the Convention as ratified by the United States”). 
 61 Garcia, de Valdenebro & Tagtachian., supra note 30, at 23. 
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apply to the vacatur of an international arbitral award, and that the 
grounds included in Chapter Two apply only to proceedings to op-
pose enforcement of an award. 
Finally, the FAA’s third chapter, §§ 301–07 (“Chapter Three”), 
incorporates the Inter-American Convention on International Com-
mercial Arbitration of 1975 (“Panama Convention”), which was 
promulgated by the Organization of American States (“OAS”) for 
the purpose of creating “a viable, treaty-based system for resolving 
inter-American commercial disputes by arbitration.”62 Further, it 
was intended to counteract and soften the effects of the Calvo Doc-
trine in Latin America, under the auspices of which many Latin 
American states had refused to ratify the New York Convention.63 
As such, the Panama Convention, with similar provisions as those 
of the New York Convention regarding recognition and enforcement 
of arbitral agreements and awards, emerged as a viable alternative 
to those nations who were, at the time, reluctant to adopt the latter.64 
1. ANNULMENT OF “NON-DOMESTIC” AWARDS RENDERED IN 
THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE FAA 
In light of the framework described above, the following con-
clusions can be drawn regarding the application of the FAA to non-
domestic, or international, arbitral awards. First, § 10 of Chapter 
One is the only provision within the FAA that states or lists grounds 
for annulment of arbitral awards.65 Second, § 202 of Chapter Two, 
which incorporates the New York Convention, applies to foreign 
and non-domestic awards, which are understood as those involving 
an international element, and lists the grounds for denying the en-
forcement of an award contained in the New York Convention.66 
Third, § 208 of Chapter Two, known as the “residual clause,” states 
that Chapter One may be used to fill in the gaps in Chapter Two, 
allowing the application of the former as long as it does not conflict 
 
 62 Joseph Jackson Jr., The 1975 Inter-American Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration: Scope, Application and Problems, 8 J. INT’L ARB. 91, 
91–100 (1991) (quoting Charles Robert Norberg, United States Implements Inter-
American Convention on Commercial Arbitration, 45 ARB J. 23, 23 (1990)). 
 63 Id. at 92–94. 
 64 Id. at 91. 
 65 Garcia, de Valdenebro & Tagtachian, supra note 30, at 23. 
 66 Id. 
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with the latter.67 Finally, Chapter Three, which incorporates the Pan-
ama Convention, also contains grounds for refusing enforcement of 
awards where the parties are nationals of Latin American contract-
ing states and the requirements for the application of the Convention  
are met.68 
Based on foregoing, therefore, it appears at first glance that there 
are no grounds for annulment of non-domestic arbitral awards in the 
FAA unless the residual clause of Chapter Three is used to “fill the 
gap.” The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
addressed this very issue in Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys 
“R” Us, Inc.69 and concluded that the grounds listed in § 10 of the 
FAA for annulment actions brought against domestic awards also 
apply to annulment actions relating to international or non-domestic 
awards. 
In Yusuf, a foreign licensee sought to confirm, under the New 
York Convention, an arbitral award against Toys “R” Us, Inc. as 
licensor.70 The arbitration was seated in the United States and the 
proceedings involved a dispute regarding a failed license agreement 
in which Toys “R” Us granted Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim and Sons, 
W.L.L. a limited right to open Toys “R” Us stores throughout the 
Middle East.71 After being awarded more than $46 million for lost 
profits, plus interest, Alghanim sought to have the award confirmed 
in the District Court for the Southern District of New York.72 Toys 
“R” Us cross-moved to vacate the award under § 10 of Chapter One 
of the FAA, arguing that it was clearly irrational and manifestly dis-
regarded the law and the agreement.73 The award was considered a 
non-domestic award because, even though the arbitration was seated 
in the United States, the dispute “involved two nondomestic parties 
and one United States corporation, and principally involved conduct 
and contract performance in the Middle East.”74  
The Southern District of New York held that,  
 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 126 F.3d 15, 21 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied 522 U.S. 1111 (1998). 
 70 Id. at 18. 
 71 Id. at 17. 
 72 Id. at 15, 18. 
 73 Id. at 18. 
 74 Id. at 19. 
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while the petition for confirmation was brought un-
der the [New York Convention], [Toys “R” Us’] 
cross-motion to vacate or modify the award was 
properly brought under [Chapter One of] the Federal 
Arbitration Act, and thus those claims were governed 
by [Chapter One of] the Federal Arbitration Act’s 
implied75 grounds for vacatur.”76  
Ultimately, the district court confirmed the award and denied 
Toys “R” Us’ cross-motion to vacate, finding the latter’s objections 
to be without merit as the arbitrators had not manifestly disregarded 
the law.77 
Toys “R” Us appealed to the Second Circuit, arguing that the 
district court erred in finding that there had been no manifest disre-
gard of the law by the arbitral tribunal.78 The primary issue before 
the Second Circuit was whether the grounds for annulment estab-
lished by Chapter One of the FAA for domestic arbitral awards, in-
cluding the non-statutory or implied grounds, could be invoked 
against a non-domestic award.79 The court ultimately affirmed the 
district court’s holding, finding that the arbitrators had not mani-
festly disregarded the law.80 
In so doing, the court reasoned that Article V(1)(e) of the Con-
vention (codified as Chapter 2 of the FAA) “allow[s] a court in the 
country under whose law the arbitration was conducted to apply do-
mestic arbitral law, in this case the FAA, to a motion to set aside or 
vacate the arbitral award.”81 The Court further noted that Article 
V(1)(e) of the Convention does not specify grounds to vacate an 
award because “had the available grounds been defined in some 
way, such action would have constituted meddling with national 
procedure for handling domestic awards, a subject beyond the 
 
 75 The grounds are considered “implied” because the grounds relied upon are 
not expressly enumerated in Chapter One, but they have been “read into” Chapter 
One based on subsequent court decisions. 
 76 Yusuf, 126 F.3d at 16. 
 77 Id. at 16–17. 
 78 Id. at 16, 18. 
 79 Id. at 20–21. 
 80 Id. at 25. 
 81 Id. at 21. 
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competence of the conference.”82 The Court stated that “the lan-
guage and history of the Convention” made clear that a petition to 
annul a foreign award in the state where the award was rendered “is 
to be governed by domestic law of the rendering state, despite the 
fact that the award is non-domestic within the meaning of the Con-
vention[.]”83 
The Second Circuit then correctly distinguished between the 
standards that govern annulment of a non-domestic award and the 
defenses against confirmation of non-domestic award.84 The court 
held as follows: 
[W]e conclude that the Convention mandates very 
different regimes for the review of arbitral awards (1) 
in the state in which, or under the law of which, the 
award was made, and (2) in other states where recog-
nition and enforcement are sought. The Convention 
specifically contemplates that the state in which, or 
under the law of which, the award is made, will be 
free to set aside or modify an award in accordance 
with its domestic arbitral law and its full panoply of 
express and implied grounds for relief. See Conven-
tion art. V(1)(e). However, the Convention is equally 
clear that when an action for enforcement is brought 
in a foreign state, the state may refuse to enforce the 
award only on the grounds explicitly set forth in Ar-
ticle V of the Convention.85 
The Second Circuit thus clarified the operative arbitral frame-
work in the United States and recognized the authority of U.S. courts 
to apply domestic arbitration law (namely Chapter One of the FAA 
and its implied grounds) in annulment proceedings against non-do-
mestic awards. Interestingly, the Second Circuit appears not to have 
relied on the residual clause of § 208 of Chapter Two of the FAA, 
but instead on the exclusive authority allocated by the Convention 
to the courts of the seat to vacate or set aside awards based on their 
 
 82 Id. at 22 (citing Quigley, supra note 38, at 1070). 
 83 Yusuf, 126 F.3d at 23. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
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domestic arbitration laws.86 The court, however, implicitly recog-
nized the role of the residual clause because it merely concluded that 
“awards may be vacated, see 9 U.S.C. § 10, or modified,”87 citing 
§ 10 of Chapter One of the FAA, and applied the grounds for vacatur 
of domestic awards to a non-domestic award.88 One could assume, 
therefore, that the Second Circuit relied on the gap-filler provision 
to fill the void between Chapter One and Chapter Two. 
The Third,89 Fifth,90 and Sixth91 Circuits have endorsed the Sec-
ond Circuit’s holding in Yusuf. In fact, the Fifth Circuit has gone one 
step further. 
In Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Min-
yak Dan Gas Bumi Negara (“Negara II”),92 the Fifth Circuit devel-
oped key nomenclature in order to better understand the framework 
applicable to enforcement and vacatur motions. The Fifth Circuit 
noted: 
The New York Convention provides a carefully 
structured framework for the review and enforce-
ment of international arbitral awards. Only a court in 
a country with primary jurisdiction over an arbitral 
award may annul that award. Courts in other coun-
tries have secondary jurisdiction; a court in a country 
with secondary jurisdiction is limited to deciding 
 
 86 See id. (discussing the “Convention” and not the FAA). 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 See Ario v. Underwriting Members of Syndicate 53, 618 F.3d 277, 290–92 
(3d Cir. 2010) (holding that application of United States law, including the do-
mestic FAA and its vacatur standard, was warranted because the arbitration took 
place in Philadelphia and the enforcement action was brought in Philadelphia). 
 90 See Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi 
Negara (“Negara I”), 335 F.3d 357, 368 (5th Cir. 2003) (“By its silence on the 
matter, the Convention does not restrict the grounds on which primary-jurisdic-
tion courts may annul an award.”). 
 91 See Jacada (Europe), Ltd. v. Int’l Mktg. Strategies, Inc., 401 F.3d 701, 709 
n.8 (6th Cir. 2005). Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 583–84 (2008) (“[T]he 
award in this case was made in the United States, and therefore Article V(1)(e) 
authorizes this court to consider our domestic law, as it is the law where the award 
was made.”). 
 92 Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas 
Bumi Negara (“Negara II”), 364 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2004). 
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whether the award may be enforced in that country. 
The Convention “mandates very different regimes 
for the review of arbitral awards (1) in the [countries] 
in which, or under the law of which, the award was 
made, and (2) in other [countries] where recognition 
and enforcement are sought.” Under the Convention, 
“the country in which, or under the [arbitration] law 
of which, [an] award was made” is said to have pri-
mary jurisdiction over the arbitration award. All 
other signatory states are secondary jurisdictions, in 
which parties can only contest whether that state 
should enforce the arbitral award. It is clear that the 
district court had secondary jurisdiction and consid-
ered only whether to enforce the Award in the United 
States. Article V enumerates specific grounds on 
which a court with secondary jurisdiction may refuse 
enforcement.93 
The resulting framework applicable to awards in the United 
States, in light of the Second Circuit’s opinion in Yusuf and the Fifth 
Circuit’s opinion in Karaha Bodas, is therefore clear. Courts of the 
jurisdiction in which the award is made, in other words, courts of 
the arbitral seat, are considered courts of “primary jurisdiction” and 
have the authority to annul or vacate an award on the grounds enu-
merated in its domestic arbitration law. All other courts are consid-
ered courts of “secondary jurisdiction” and may only enforce, or 
deny enforcement, of an award based on the grounds set forth in the 
Convention. 
IV. INDUSTRIAL RISK INSURERS AND THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S 
CONFLATION OF GROUNDS FOR DENYING ENFORCEMENT AND 
VACATING ARBITRAL AWARDS 
Notwithstanding the extensive reasoning presented by the Sec-
ond Circuit’s 1997 opinion in Yusuf and the Fifth Circuit’s decision 
in Nagara II, the Eleventh Circuit, when faced with an identical 
question as to the grounds applicable to a vacatur petition of a non-
domestic award in 1998, inexplicably held that a party seeking to 
 
 93 Id. at 287 (emphasis added). 
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vacate or annul an arbitral award can only rely on the grounds listed 
in Article V of the Convention, which, as has been extensively dis-
cussed before, are only available to parties resisting enforcement. 
The case in question, Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gu-
tehoffnungshütte GmbH,94 involved a complex commercial dispute 
in which a Florida nitric acid manufacturer, Nitram, Inc. (“Nitram”), 
contracted with a Texas corporation, Barnard and Burk Group, Inc., 
for the provision and installation of a tail gas expander in Nitram’s 
manufacturing plant.95 The Texas corporation then contracted with 
a Louisiana corporation, Barnard and Burk Engineers and Construc-
tors, Inc. (“Barnard Group and Engineers”) to perform the engineer-
ing work for the installation.96 Barnard Group and Engineers subse-
quently contracted with a German turbine manufacturer, M.A.N. 
Maschinefabrik Augsburg-Nürnberg AG (“MAN”), to purchase the 
tail gas expander.97 As the successor-in-interest to MAN, M.A.N. 
Gutehoffnungshütte GmbH (“MAN GHH”) was responsible for de-
signing, manufacturing, and delivering the tail gas expander, and for 
providing technical guidance regarding its installation.98 Barnard 
Group and Engineers, on the other hand, was responsible for the 
piping for the tail gas expander.99 The installed equipment subse-
quently crashed on two occasions.100 Industrial Risk Insurers, a 
Hartford-based insurance company, had provided business risk in-
surance to Nitram.101 In 1985, Nitram sued both Industrial Risk In-
surers and Barnard and Burk Group, Inc., arguing that one of the 
two defendants was responsible for the payment of losses.102 After 
settling the state litigation, the parties agreed to submit several re-
maining issues to arbitration.103 
At the heart of the claims in the arbitration proceedings was 
whether the two wrecks were caused by Barnard Group and 
 
 94 Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshütte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434 
(11th Cir. 1998). 
 95 Id. at 1437. 
 96 Id. at 1438. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 1439. 
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Engineers’ design and piping or by MAN GHH’s expander.104 The 
arbitral tribunal ruled in favor of MAN GHH, concluding that Bar-
nard Group and Engineers’ design and piping caused the two 
wrecks, and awarding MAN GHH costs and conversion rate com-
pensation.105 Barnard Group and Engineers moved to annul or va-
cate the arbitration award at the seat of the arbitration, and specifi-
cally in the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Florida, on the grounds that “the award was ‘arbitrary and capri-
cious’ and that the arbitration panel improperly and prejudicially ad-
mitted certain testimony and evidence.”106 The grounds, the court 
interpreted, did not both fall squarely within the New York Conven-
tion, because even though the challenge pertaining to the improperly 
admitted evidence could be considered to be based on Article 
V(1)(d) of the Convention, the “arbitrary and capricious” challenge, 
raised under Chapter 2 of the FAA, was not enumerated by the New 
York Convention.107 The district court denied the motion for vacatur 
and confirmed the award.108 Bernard Group and Engineers appealed 
the denial of the motion for vacatur.109 
On appeal, the relevant issue before the Eleventh Circuit, just as 
in Yusuf, involved whether the grounds for annulment established in 
Chapter One of the FAA applied to non-domestic awards.110 Con-
trary to what the Second Circuit had decided roughly a year before, 
however, the Eleventh Circuit held that the annulment proceeding 
was governed by Chapter Two, which lists the grounds for denial of 
enforcement (not annulment), because Chapter Two applied to “all 
arbitral awards not ‘entirely between citizens of the United States’” 
and, because the award had been made “within the legal framework 
of another country.”111 
The court mistakenly considered that the international nature of 
the award implied that all proceedings relating to it shall be gov-
erned by Chapter Two and ignored the residual clause included in 
 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 See Nitram, Inc. v. Indus. Risk Insurers, 848 F. Supp. 162, 165 (M.D. Fla. 
1994). 
 108 Indus. Risk Insurers, 141 F.3d at 1439. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 1439–40. 
 111 Id. at 1440–41. 
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§ 208 of that same chapter. In so doing, it also ignored the difference 
between the grounds for vacating awards and those for denying en-
forcement of an award which the Second Circuit had considered key 
in Yusuf. 
The court then addressed the grounds for vacatur that could be 
raised to annul a non-domestic award rendered in the United 
States.112 Specifically, the court analyzed whether a non-domestic 
arbitral award could be annulled on the ground that it is “arbitrary 
and capricious.”113 Instead of conducting the appropriate analysis 
pursuant to Article V of the Convention and the residual clause of 
the FAA, which leads to an application of the grounds established 
in § 10(a)(1)(4) of Chapter One, the court incorrectly concluded that 
a party seeking to annul or vacate a non-domestic award can only 
rely on the grounds to challenge enforcement of a non-domestic 
award provided by Article V of the New York Convention.114  
Applying this flawed analytical framework, the court deter-
mined that the award could not be annulled on the ground that it was 
“arbitrary and capricious” because it was not one of the enumerated 
defenses provided by the New York Convention.115 The court noted: 
“that no defense against enforcement of an international arbitral 
award under Chapter 2 of the FAA is available on the ground that 
the award is ‘arbitrary and capricious,’ or on any other grounds not 
specified by the Convention.”116 Surprisingly, even though the court 
repeatedly cited to Yusuf, it failed to understand the distinction be-
tween vacatur petitions and motions to deny enforcement of an 
award, instead applying the grounds for denial of enforcement to an 
annulment petition. 
V. RECENT DECISIONS UPHOLDING OR DISTINGUISHING 
INDUSTRIAL RISK 
In light of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Industrial Risk, 
courts within the circuit have followed its holding and applied it to 
 
 112 Id. at 1445. 
 113 Id. at 1445–46. 
 114 Id. at 1443, 1445–46. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 1443. 
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cases before them.117 Nonetheless, even though the Eleventh Circuit 
recently had the opportunity to revisit its holding and change course 
in Bamberger Rosenheim, Ltd. v. OA Development, Inc.,118 it 
avoided addressing the issue directly. 
In Bamberger, the Eleventh Circuit was faced with an appeal 
from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.119 
The case involved Bamberger Rosenheim, Ltd. (“Profimex”), an Is-
raeli company focused on raising capital for real estate investments, 
and OA Development, Inc. (“OAD”), a Georgia real estate devel-
oper.120 Profimex and OAD entered into a solicitation agreement 
that provided for the arbitration of disputes submitted by OAD in 
Tel Aviv, Israel, and for the arbitration of disputes submitted by 
Profimex in Atlanta, Georgia.121 After relations between the parties 
deteriorated, Profimex commenced arbitration in Atlanta against 
OAD for breach of contract.122 OAD submitted a counterclaim 
against Profimex alleging that it had defamed OAD in statements to 
Israeli investors.123 Profimex objected to the counterclaim’s arbitra-
tion in Atlanta, arguing that pursuant to the arbitration agreement, 
OAD’s claims must be arbitrated in Tel Aviv.124 The arbitrator ulti-
mately determined that venue for the defamation counterclaim was 
proper in Atlanta and found Profimex liable on OAD’s defamation 
counterclaim.125 
The appellant, Profimex, filed a petition to vacate the arbitrator’s 
defamation award in the Northern District of Georgia, and OAD 
cross-petitioned to confirm the award.126 Profimex raised several 
grounds for vacatur and defenses against confirmation, but the court 
 
 117 See generally, e.g., Gonsalvez v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 935 F. Supp. 2d 
1325 (S.D. Fla. 2013); Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. v. Soskin, No. 17-21663-
Civ, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20096 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2019); Williams v. NCL 
(Bah.) Ltd., No. 18-22774-CV, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189286 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 
2018); Pochat v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 12-22397-CIV, 
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119447 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2013). 
 118 862 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 119 Id. at 1284. 
 120 Id. at 1286. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 1285–86. 
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confirmed the award.127 Profimex argued that the district court had 
erred in denying its petition to vacate the award because “the arbitral 
procedure [had not been conducted] in accordance with the agree-
ment of the parties,” contravening Article V(1)(d) of the New York 
Convention.128 It also argued that the district court had erred in 
denying its petition under Chapter One because the arbitrator had 
exceeded its powers in violation of 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).129 
Even though this was an opportunity for the Eleventh Circuit to 
further confirm or finally abandon Industrial Risk, it avoided the is-
sue altogether by stating that it “[saw] no reason to analyze 
Profimex’s arguments under the New York Convention or 
§ 10(a)(4) [Chapter One] separately.”130 The court considered that 
the arguments were intertwined because Profimex asserted that “the 
arbitrator improperly applied the arbitral-venue provision in the par-
ties’ agreement to arbitrate.”131 The crux of both arguments, the 
court considered, was the fact that OAD’s counterclaim had been 
arbitrated in Atlanta, which led Profimex to argue both that the ar-
bitral procedure had not been in accordance with the agreement of 
the parties in contravention of Article V(1)(d) of the New York Con-
vention and that the arbitrator had exceeded its powers in violation 
of Chapter One.132 
The Eleventh Circuit initially confirmed the lower court holding 
denying the vacatur petition, quoting Industrial Risk, and finding 
that non-domestic awards “must be confirmed unless appellants can 
successfully assert one of the seven defenses against enforcement of 
the award enumerated in Article V of the New York Convention,”133 
but did not expressly address whether the challenge raised under 9 
U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) was admissible. 
Therefore, even though the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Industrial 
Risk’s premise that non-domestic awards can only be vacated—in 
the United States—if one of the exclusive grounds of Article V of 
 
 127 Id. at 1286. 
 128 Id. at 1287. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. (quoting Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshütte GmbH, 
141 F.3d 1434, 1441 (11th Cir. 1998)). 
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the New York Convention is successfully asserted, it did not explic-
itly reject Profimex’s challenge under Chapter One of the FAA. 
Whether it deliberately did so was a question that remained, for the 
moment, unanswered. 
The question, however, did not remain unanswered for long. Re-
cently, the opportunity again arose for the Eleventh Circuit to cor-
rect its error in Industrial Risk. Instead of embracing the approach 
taken by the majority of federal circuits, however, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit in Inversiones y Procesadora Tropical INPROTSA, S.A. v. Del 
Monte Int’l GmbH134 once again affirmed its holding in Industrial 
Risk. In addition to standing by Industrial Risk, the Eleventh Circuit 
upheld sanctions that were imposed on a party for having raised 
what it considered “baseless” grounds for vacatur, “especially con-
sidering that INPROTSA [had] failed to assert a valid defense under 
the [New York] Convention.”135 In so doing, the court’s decision 
demonstrates the serious consequences that can arise from a funda-
mental misconception and misunderstanding of the framework ap-
plicable to the vacatur of arbitral awards discussed above. 
In INPROTSA, Del Monte initiated arbitration proceedings 
against INPROTSA in Miami.136 The arbitral tribunal rendered an 
award in June 2016 finding that INPROTSA had breached its pur-
chase and sale agreement with Del Monte pertaining to the produc-
tion, packaging, and sale of pineapples.137 In September 2016, 
INPROTSA sought to vacate the award in state court.138 The petition 
was ultimately removed to federal court following Del Monte’s re-
moval petition.139 Del Monte then moved both to dismiss the vacatur 
 
 134 Inversiones y Procesadora Tropical INPROTSA, S.A. v. Del Monte Int’l 
GmbH (“INPROTSA 2019”), 783 F. App’x 972, 974 (11th Cir. 2019). In full 
transparency, the author’s law firm, Hogan Lovells US LLP, was counsel of rec-
ord for Inversiones y Procesadora Tropical INPROTSA, S.A. in the underlying 
arbitration proceedings and subsequent vacatur actions and appeals. The author, 
Juan C. Garcia, worked on the matter as a member of the firm. The co-author, 
Ivan Bracho Gonzalez, also worked on the matter as a summer associate for the 
firm Hogan Lovells US, LLP. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at 973. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id.  
 139 Id. 
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petition and to confirm the award.140 INPROTSA, on the other hand, 
moved to remand the proceeding to state court, alleging that the dis-
trict court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.141 
The Southern District granted Del Monte’s motion to dismiss 
INPROTSA’s vacatur petition and denied the latter’s motion to re-
mand, concluding that its petition, based on Florida law, had “failed 
to assert a valid defense under the [New York Convention], as re-
quired by [Industrial Risk].”142 In short, the court, relying on Indus-
trial Risk, applied the grounds for denying the enforcement of an 
arbitral award under the New York Convention to a vacatur petition. 
The magistrate judge’s discussion and consideration of 
INPROTSA’s alleged grounds for vacatur, which was implicitly 
adopted by the Eleventh Circuit, was limited to stating that the peti-
tion to vacate had “not raise[d] cognizable grounds for vacatur,” 
concluding that under controlling precedent from the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, namely Industrial Risk, the grounds to vacate international ar-
bitration awards are limited to those contained in the New York 
Convention.143 Despite INPROTSA’s attempts at clarifying the pa-
tent conflation by reiterating that the petition sought vacatur and that 
it had appropriately relied on grounds for vacatur found in the FAA 
as opposed to the New York Convention, its efforts were to no 
avail.144  
Based on the Southern District’s decision, Del Monte then 
sought attorney’s fees “under the court’s inherent authority, claim-
ing INPROTSA’s grounds to seek vacatur were baseless and 
brought in bad faith.”145 A magistrate judge recommended granting 
Del Monte’s motion, considering that “INPROTSA’s petition to va-
cate lacked any real basis for vacatur, and ‘amount[ed] to little more 
than an assault on the Tribunal’s factfinding and contractual inter-
pretation rather than on its actual authority.’”146 The Southern 
 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. at 973–74 (emphasis added). 
 143 Inversiones y Procesadora Tropical INPROTSA, S.A. v. Del Monte Int’l 
GmbH (“INPROTSA 2018”), No. 16-24275-CV, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152115, 
at *13 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 4, 2018); see also INPROTSA 2019, 783 F. App’x at 973–
74. 
 144 INPROTSA 2018, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152115, at *8–9. 
 145 INPROTSA 2019, 783 F. App’x at 974. 
 146 Id. 
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District adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and con-
firmed the sanctions imposed upon INPROTSA based on the inher-
ent authority of courts to sanction parties who pursue “frivolous 
challenges to arbitration awards in the court system.”147 
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, INPROTSA argued that the 
district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the motion to 
vacate the arbitration award and that the lower court had abused its 
discretion in awarding sanctions to Del Monte.148 After disposing of 
INPROTSA’s allegation pertaining to lack of subject-matter juris-
diction,149 the Eleventh Circuit, relying on Hercules Steel150 and 
stating that “if a party on the short end of an arbitration award attacks 
that award in court without any real legal basis for doing so, that 
party should pay sanctions,” held that the district court had not 
abused its discretion in awarding sanctions to Del Monte, making 
no mention whatsoever of the ground for vacatur that it considered 
non-existent.151 
The ground for vacatur at issue, although missing from the Elev-
enth Circuit’s opinion, was centered on INPROTSA’s allegation 
that “the tribunal panel exceeded its powers by reaching an interpre-
tation of the contract that was ‘not rationally derived from the par-
ties’ agreement’ and was ‘completely irrational.’”152 INPROTSA’s 
original vacatur petition also alleged that the panel had ignored 
“Florida law applicable to restrictive covenants and damages; and 
that it denied [INPROTSA] of due process by failing to give weight 
to [its] defenses and evidence, specifically, a written statement of a 
witness who was not subjected to cross-examination.”153 
Subsequently, INPROTSA filed a certiorari petition to the 
United States Supreme Court, asking the Court to settle the circuit 
split over “whether the New York Convention’s defenses to confir-
mation provide the exclusive grounds for vacating a New York 
 
 147 Id. at 973–74. 
 148 Id. at 974. 
 149 Id. 
 150 B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 913–14 (11th 
Cir. 2006). 
 151 INPROTSA 2019, 783 F. App’x at 974 (internal quotations omitted). 
 152 INPROTSA 2018, No. 16-24275-CV, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152115, at 
*3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 4, 2018). 
 153 Id. 
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Convention award.”154 In October 2019, however, the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari.155 As a result, Industrial Risk remains set-
tled law in the Eleventh Circuit, meaning that petitions seeking to 
annul or vacate international arbitration awards are analyzed under 
the grounds for denying enforcement set forth in the New York Con-
vention, rather than the grounds for vacatur established in the FAA. 
VI. PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF INDUSTRIAL RISK AND ITS 
PROGENY 
The Eleventh Circuit’s rule emerging from Industrial Risk prob-
ably raises little-to-no concerns to the international audience, at least 
from the standpoint of available grounds for annulment. As men-
tioned before, most jurisdictions have adopted the Model Law,156 
meaning that the grounds for vacatur are identical to the grounds for 
opposing enforcement of an arbitral award.157 
In the United States, however, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in 
Industrial Risk can have significant consequences, as exemplified in 
the INPROTSA case. Industrial Risk limits the right of parties to 
challenge non-domestic arbitration awards by denying a party the 
right to raise grounds for vacatur under the law of the arbitral seat, 
including the grounds for vacatur under the FAA.158 Further, Indus-
trial Risk not only eliminates the grounds for vacatur under Chapter 
One of the FAA, but it also prevents parties from asserting implied 
or non-statutory grounds for vacatur such as “manifest disregard of 
the law” and “arbitrary and capricious,” among others.159 
Additionally, Industrial Risk evidences a lack of understanding 
by the Eleventh Circuit of the operative federal arbitration 
 
 154 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 15, Inversiones y Procesadora Tropical 
INPROTSA, S.A. v. Del Monte Int’l GmbH, 2019 WL 3380417, at *15 (U.S. July 
25, 2019) (No. 19-117). 
 155 Inversiones y Procesadoa Tropical INPROTSA, S.A. v. Del Monte Int'l 
GmbH, 140 S. Ct. 124 (2019). 
 156 See supra Part III.A. 
 157 Compare UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 44, art. 34, with New York 
Convention, supra note 13, art. V. 
 158 Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshütte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434, 
1443, 1445–46 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 159 See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 
317–18 (4th ed. 2004). 
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framework and the subsequent interplay that exists—or should ex-
ist—between Chapters One and Two of the FAA. Such erroneous 
interpretation negates the intent of the framers of the Convention not 
to bind themselves to exclusive grounds for annulment and renders 
the residual clause of the FAA meaningless.160 
Finally, another important—and often overlooked—conse-
quence of Industrial Risk affects the Panama Convention, incorpo-
rated in Chapter 3 of the FAA.161 The Panama Convention is con-
sidered as part of “the supreme law of the land” by virtue of the 
Supremacy Clause found in Article VI of the Constitution.162 The 
former, which is also applicable to non-domestic arbitral awards, 
also contains grounds for denying enforcement just as the New York 
Convention.163 Yet, the Eleventh Circuit in Industrial Risk categor-
ically stated that an appeal of an arbitral motion must be denied un-
less an appellant “can successfully assert one of the seven defenses 
against enforcement of the award enumerated in Article V of the 
New York Convention.”164 Taking the Eleventh Circuit’s rationale 
at face value, it then should follow that the Panama Convention pro-
vides the grounds for annulment in cases where the Panama Con-
vention applies. While it is true that the grounds for annulment listed 
in both Conventions are identical, the result is the same: the Elev-
enth Circuit, through Industrial Risk, explicitly ignored and negated 
the full force and effect of the Panama Convention, a treaty placed 
on equal footing with the New York Convention and which also 
constitutes “the supreme law of the land.”165 
As a result, the Eleventh Circuit remains an outlier amongst the 
Circuit Courts in the United States. While most of the country’s Cir-
cuit Courts have determined that federal arbitration law can be ap-
plied to vacate non-domestic awards, the Eleventh Circuit stands 
 
 160 See Samra, supra note 40, at 379. 
 161 Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 
30, 1975, 1483 U.N.T.S. 249; 9 U.S.C. §§ 301–07 (2018). 
 162 U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 163 Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, su-
pra note 161, art. 5. 
 164 Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Guttehoffnungshütte GmbH, 141 F.3d 
1434, 1441 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 165 U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
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alone affirming that no defense or ground for vacatur exists outside 
the New York Convention.166 
 
 
 166 Caroline Simson, Top 5 International Arbitration Decisions of 2019, 
LAW360 (Dec. 20, 2019, 6:48 PM), https://www.law360.com/arti-
cles/1223746/top-5-international-arbitration-decisions-of-2019. 
